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Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 49 (August 4, 2011)1 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS – Termination of Non-Parental Visitation 
 
Summary 
  
Appeal from a court order granting Respondent’s motion to terminate grandparent 
visitation with Respondent’s minor child.   
 
Disposition 
 
 District court’s judgment reversed and remanded.  Stipulated visitation orders are final 
decrees entitled to res judicata protections.  The parental presumption no longer controls once 
visitation rights are judicially approved.  To modify or terminate a visitation order, the moving 
party must demonstrate changed circumstances affecting the child’s welfare and that 
modification or termination is in the child’s best interest. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Respondent Roger Rennels (“Roger”) received sole custody of his daughter, Martina, 
after divorcing her mother in 2001.  Subsequently, Roger and Martina moved in with Roger’s 
mother, appellant Audrey Rennels (“Audrey”).  After a five month stay, Roger and Martina 
moved to Texas.  Audrey and Martina remained close and visited one another.  In 2003, Roger 
and Martina moved to Las Vegas.  Thereafter, Roger married his current wife, Respondent 
Jennifer Rennels (“Jennifer”).  In 2006, Jennifer adopted Martina. 
 
 Appellant Audrey sought court-ordered non-parental visitation pursuant to NRS 125C.05, 
claiming Roger stopped allowing Martina to see her in June 2004 because he disapproved of the 
frequent contact.  Respondent Roger opposed with a motion to dismiss.  The district court denied 
the motion to dismiss and required an evidentiary hearing because there was a rebuttable 
presumption that granting non-parental visitation over a parent’s objection is not in the child’s 
best interest. 
 
 Before the evidentiary hearing, the parties reached a settlement regarding visitation and 
the court prepared a visitation order.  The order allowed Audrey four supervised visits per year, 
which would become unsupervised if a psychologist so determined.  In 2008, a psychologist 
recommended unsupervised visitation, but Roger refused.  The district court denied Audrey’s  
motion to compel Roger to comply with the order and granted Roger and Jennifer’s motion to 
terminate visitation altogether. 
 
Discussion 
The Stipulated Visitation Order was Final 
 
 Public policy favors prompt and voluntary resolution of matters relating to minor 
children.2  Additionally, the Supreme Court of Nevada recognizes the preclusive effect of such 
                                                            
1 By Erin Elliott. 
agreements if deemed final.3  An order is final when it fully resolves the presented issues and 
leaves nothing for future consideration, regardless of what the order is actually called.4   Final 
judgments regarding non-parental visitation matters have preclusive effects on subsequent 
litigation.5 
 
 Here, the visitation order was final because the order resolved the visitation dispute, 
memorialized the agreement, set forth the specific parameters for visitation, and provided for 
modifications.  There was no indication that the parties intended that the order be anything other 
than a final judgment.  Additionally, the order remained unchallenged for two years.  Because 
the order was final, it precludes re-litigation of Audrey’s right to visitation based on the same set 
of facts already considered by the district court. 
 
The Parental Presumption 
 
 The United States Supreme Court presumes fit parents act in their children’s best 
interests.6   As a result, fit parents’ wishes must accord at least some special weight with courts.7  
NRS 125C.050(4) also provides fit parental deference, stating that after a parent has “denied or 
unreasonably restricted visits with the child, there is a rebuttable presumption that the right to 
visitation . . . is not in the best interests of the child.”8   
 
However, when there is a court-ordered custody arrangement, the nonparent has 
effectively rebutted the parental presumption.9  The Supreme Court of Nevada extended this rule 
to judicially approved nonparent visitation arrangements, stating the parental presumption does 
not apply, giving deference to court orders, and promoting stability for children.10  
 
The Ellis Test 
 
The Ellis test was originally used for modifying custody arrangements, but the  Supreme 
Court of Nevada extended Ellis to also govern modifications and terminations of judicially 
approved nonparent visitation rights.  Under the Ellis test, modifications and terminations are 
only warranted when 1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the 
welfare of the child, and 2) the child’s best interest is served by the modification.11  Courts 
should evaluate both prongs without regard to parental preference. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
2 See Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. 410, 429, 922 P.3d 213, 226-27 (2009); Ellis v. Carcucci, 123 Nev. 145, 151, 161 
P.3d 239, 243 (2007). 
3 See Castle v. Simmons, 120 Nev. 98, 105, 86 P.3d 1042, 1047 (2004). 
4 Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 445, 874 P.2d 729, 733 (1994). 
5 Ingram v. Knippers, 72 P.3d 17, 22 (Okla. 2003). 
6 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000). 
7 Id. at 70. 
8 NEV. REV. STAT. 125C.050(4) (2007). 
9  See Hudson v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 713-14, 138 P.3d 429, 432-33 (2006). 
10 Ellis v. Carcucci, 123 Nev. 145, 151; 161 P.3d 239, 243 (2007). 
11 Id. at 150, 242. 
Prong One:  Substantial Change in Circumstances Affecting the Welfare of the Child 
 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada did not address what circumstances are sufficient enough 
to modify or terminate a nonparent’s visitation rights.  However, some hostility between the 
parent and nonparent is insufficient, especially since animosity exists when a party resorts to 
litigation to settle visitation issues.12 
 
 Here, neither parties nor the district court addressed changed circumstances before 
terminating Audrey’s rights.  Rather than make specific findings regarding changed 
circumstances, the district court cited acrimony between the parties.  Acrimony, by itself, is 
insufficient to demonstrate changed circumstances. 
 
Prong Two:  The Best Interests of the Child 
 
 To evaluate whether a parent’s request to modify or terminate a nonparent’s judicially 
approved visitation is in the best interest of the child, courts should consider the factors in NRS 
125.480(4) and any other relevant considerations.  The district court must consider custodial 
stability in applying the factors.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The stipulated visitation order entered into by the parties was final because the order 
resolved the visitation dispute, memorialized the agreement, set forth the specific parameters for 
visitation, and provided for modifications. Furthermore, the district court failed to consider 
Roger’s motion to terminate Audrey’s visitation rights in light of the Ellis factors. Consequently, 
the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  Meanwhile, the stipulated visitation 
order remained in full force and effect. 
                                                            
12 Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 113 Nev. 51, 58, 930 P.2d 1110, 1114 (1997). 
